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Abstract
Can an intelligent jammer learn and adapt to unknown environments in an electronic warfare-type
scenario? In this paper, we answer this question in the positive, by developing a cognitive jammer
that adaptively and optimally disrupts the communication between a victim transmitter-receiver pair. We
formalize the problem using a novel multi-armed bandit framework where the jammer can choose various
physical layer parameters such as the signaling scheme, power level and the on-off/pulsing duration in
an attempt to obtain power efficient jamming strategies. We first present novel online learning algorithms
to maximize the jamming efficacy against static transmitter-receiver pairs and prove that our learning
algorithm converges to the optimal (in terms of the error rate inflicted at the victim and the energy used)
jamming strategy. Even more importantly, we prove that the rate of convergence to the optimal jamming
strategy is sub-linear, i.e. the learning is fast in comparison to existing reinforcement learning algorithms,
which is particularly important in dynamically changing wireless environments. Also, we characterize
the performance of the proposed bandit-based learning algorithm against multiple static and adaptive
transmitter-receiver pairs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The inherent openness of the wireless medium makes it susceptible to adversarial attacks. The vul-
nerabilities of a wireless system can be largely classified based on the capability of an adversary- a) an
eavesdropping attack in which the eavesdropper (passive adversary) can listen to the wireless channel and
try to infer information (which if leaked may severely compromise data integrity) [1], [2], b) a jamming
attack, in which the jammer (active adversary) can transmit energy or information in order to disrupt
reliable data transmission or reception [4]-[6] and c) a hybrid attack in which the adversary can either
passively eavesdrop or actively jam any ongoing transmission [7], [8]. In this paper, we study the ability
of an agent to learn efficient jamming attacks against static and adaptive victim transmitter-receiver pairs.
Jamming has traditionally been studied by using either optimization or game-theoretic or information
theoretic principles, see [9]-[15] and references therein. The major disadvantage of these studies is that
they assume the jammer has a lot of a priori information about the strategies used by the (victim)
transmitter-receiver pairs, channel gains, etc., which may not be available in practical scenarios. For
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2instance, in our prior work [11], we showed that it is not always optimal (in terms of the error rate) to
match the jammer’s signal to the victim’s signaling scheme and that the optimal jamming signal follows
a pulsed-jamming strategy. However, these optimal jamming strategies were obtained by assuming that
the jammer has a priori knowledge regarding the transmission strategy of the victim transmitter-receiver
pair. In contrast to prior work (both ours and others), in this paper we develop online learning algorithms
that learn the optimal jamming strategy by repeatedly interacting with the victim transmitter-receiver
pair. Essentially, the jammer must learn to act in an unknown environment in order to maximize its total
reward (e.g., jamming success rate).
Numerous approaches have been proposed to learn how to act in unknown communication environ-
ments. A canonical example is reinforcement learning (RL) [16]-[25], in which a radio (agent) learns
and adapts its transmission strategy using the transmission success feedback of the transmission actions
it has used in the past. Specifically, it learns the optimal strategy by repeatedly interacting with the
environment (for example, the wireless channel). During these interactions, the agent receives feedback
indicating whether the actions performed were good or bad. The performance of the action taken is
measured as a reward or cost, whose meaning and value depends on the specific application under
consideration. For instance, the reward can be throughput, the negative of the energy cost, or a function
of both these variables. In [18]-[20], Q-Learning based algorithms were proposed to address jamming and
anti-jamming strategies against adaptive opponents in multi-channel scenarios. It is well-known that such
learning algorithms can guarantee optimality only asymptotically, for example as the number of packet
transmissions goes to infinity. However, strategies with only asymptotic guarantees cannot be relied upon
in mission-critical applications, where failure to achieve the required performance level will have severe
consequences. For example, in jamming applications, the jammer needs to learn and adapt its strategy
against its opponent in a timely manner. Hence, the rate of learning matters.
As discussed above, none of the previous works considered the learning performance of physical layer
jamming strategies in electronic warfare environments where the jammer has limited to no knowledge
about the victim transmitter-receiver pair. Further, the existing learning algorithms [18]-[28] cannot be
applied to the problem under consideration because a) none of the existing learning algorithms consider
learning over a mixed (mixture of discrete/finite and continuous/infinite actions) action space and b) they
do not give any performance guarantees for the jammer’s actions. To fill this gap, in this paper, we present
novel multi-armed bandit (MAB) algorithms to enable the jammer to learn the optimal physical layer
jamming strategies, that were obtained in [11], when the jammer has limited knowledge about the victim.
While MAB algorithms have been used in the context of wireless communications to address the selection
3of a wireless channel in either cognitive radio networks [21]-[23] or in the presence of an adversary [24],
or antenna selection in MIMO systems [25], these works only consider learning over a finite action set. In
contrast, the proposed algorithms in this paper enable the jammer to learn the optimal jamming strategies
against both static and adaptive victim transmitter-receiver pairs by simultaneously choosing actions from
both finite and infinite arm sets (i.e., they can either come from a continuous or a discrete space), that
are defined based on the physical layer parameters of the jamming signal. In addition, our algorithms
also provide time-dependent (not asymptotic) performance bounds on the jamming performance against
static and adaptive victim transmitter-receiver pairs. We note that the algorithms proposed in this paper
are novel even within the large area of multi-armed bandits. The major differences between our work
and the prior work on multi-armed bandit problems (general works that are not related to jamming) are
summarized in Table I.
TABLE I. COMPARISON BETWEEN RELATED BANDIT WORKS
Finite armed Continuum armed Adversarial Our work
bandits [26] bandits [28] bandits [27]
Regret bounds Logarithmic Sublinear Sublinear Sublinear
(function of time)
Action rewards i.i.d. i.i.d. adversarial i.i.d.
(worst-case)
Action set finite continuous finite mixed
We measure the jamming performance of a learning algorithm using the notion of regret, which is
defined as the difference between the cumulative reward of the optimal (for example, a strategy that
minimizes the throughput of the victim while using minimum energy) jamming strategy when there is
complete knowledge about the victim transmitter-receiver pair, and the cumulative reward achieved by
the proposed learning algorithm. Any algorithm with regret that scales sub-linearly in time, will converge
to the optimal strategy in terms of the average reward. These regret bounds can also provide a rate on
how fast the jammer converges to the optimal strategy without having any a priori knowledge about the
victim’s strategy and the wireless channel. As will be discussed in detail later, the feedback considered
in this work is also minimal in comparison to the earlier jamming literature [9]-[15].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the system model in Section II. The jamming
performance against static and adaptive transmitter-receiver pairs is considered in Sections III and IV
respectively, where we develop novel learning algorithms for the jammer and present high confidence
bounds for its learning performance. Numerical results are presented in Section V where we discuss the
learning behavior in both single and multi-user scenarios and finally conclude the paper in Section VI.
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Fig. 1. A wireless environment with victim transmitter-receiver pair and a jammer that intends to disrupt their communication.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We first consider a single jammer and a single victim transmitter-receiver pair in a discrete time setting
(t = 1, 2, . . .). We assume that the data conveyed between the transmitter-receiver pair is mapped onto
an unknown digital amplitude-phase constellation. The low pass equivalent of this signal is represented
as x(t) =
∑∞
m=−∞
√
Pxxmg(t −mT ), where Px is the average received signal power, g(t) is the real
valued pulse shape and T is the symbol interval. The random variables xm denote the modulated symbols
assumed to be uniformly distributed among all possible constellation points. Without loss of generality,
the average energy of g(t) and modulated symbols E(|xm|2) are normalized to unity.1
It is assumed that x(t) passes through an AWGN channel (received power is constant over the observa-
tion interval) while being attacked by a jamming signal represented as j(t) =
∑∞
m=−∞
√
PJjmg(t−mT ),
where PJ is the average jamming signal power as seen at the victim receiver and jm denote the jamming
signals with E(|jm|2) ≤ 1. Assuming a coherent receiver and perfect synchronization, the received
signal after matched filtering and sampling at the symbol intervals is given by yk = y(t = kT ) =
√
Pxxk +
√
PJjk + nk, k = 1, 2, .. (as shown in Fig. 1), where nk is the zero-mean additive white
Gaussian noise with variance denoted by σ2. Let SNR = Pxσ2 and JNR =
PJ
σ2 . From [11], the optimal
jamming signal shares time between two different power levels one of which is 0 and is hence defined by
the on-off/pulsing duration ρ. In other words, the jammer sends the jamming signal j(t) at power level
JNR/ρ with probability ρ and at power level 0 (i.e., no jamming signal is sent) with probability 1− ρ.
For more details on the structure of the jamming signals, please see [11]. While the analysis shown
in Sections III and IV assumes coherent reception at the victim receiver (i.e., the jamming signal is
coherently received along with the transmitter’s signal), we consider the effects of a phase offset between
these two signals in Section V. The effects of a timing offset between x and j can also be addressed
along similar lines, but is skipped in this paper due to a lack of space.
1Any signal which follows a wireless standard (such as LTE) would have known parameters such as g(t) and T [29].
5III. JAMMING AGAINST A STATIC TRANSMITTER-RECEIVER PAIR
In this section, we consider scenarios where the victim uses a fixed modulation scheme with a fixed
SNR. We propose an online learning algorithm for the jammer which learns the optimal power efficient
jamming strategy over time, without knowing the victim’s transmission strategy.
A. Set of actions for the jammer
At each time t the jammer chooses its signaling scheme, power level and on-off/pulsing duration. A
joint selection of these is also referred to as an action. We assume that the set of signaling schemes has
Nmod elements and the average power level belongs to the set JNR ∈ [JNRmin, JNRmax].2 The jamming
signal j(t) is defined by the signaling scheme (for example AWGN, BPSK or QPSK ) and power level
selected at time t. It is shown in [11] that the optimal jamming signal does not have a fixed power level,
but instead it should alternate between two different power levels one of which is 0. In other words, the
jammer sends the jamming signal j at power level JNR/ρ with probability ρ and at 0 (i.e., no jamming
signal is sent) with probability 1 − ρ. Notice that such pulsed-jamming strategies enable the jammer
to cause errors with a low average energy but a high instantaneous energy [11]. Therefore, the optimal
jamming signal is characterized by the signaling scheme, the average power level and the pulse duration
ρ ∈ (0, 1] which indicates the fraction of time that the jammer is transmitting. The jammer should learn
these optimal physical layer parameters by first transmitting the jamming signal and then by observing
the reward obtained for its actions.
We formulate this learning problem as a mixed multi-armed bandit (mixed-MAB) problem. In contrast
to prior work on MAB problems, in a mixed-MAB the action space consists of both finite (signaling set)
and continuum (power level, pulse duration) sets of actions. Next, we propose an online learning algorithm
called Jamming Bandits (JB) where the jammer learns by repeatedly interacting with the transmitter-
receiver pair. The jammer receives feedback about its actions by observing the acknowledgment /no
acknowledgement (ACK/NACK) packets that are exchanged between the transmitter-receiver pair [31].
The average number of NACKs gives an estimate of the PER which can be used to estimate the SER
as as 1 − (1 − PER)1/Nsym where Nsym is the number of symbols in one packet (other metrics such
as throughput or goodput allowed can also be considered [30]). Remember that the SER and PER are
2Although we use the variable JNR throughout this paper, it is crucial to notice that the proposed algorithms only need the
knowledge of the power with which j(t) is transmitted by the jammer and do not need to know the power of the jamming
signal as seen at the victim receiver (which depends on the wireless channel whose knowledge is not available to the jammer).
There is an unknown but consistent mapping between the jammer’s transmit power and JNR. The notation JNR is only used
to make the exposition of the Theorems and the algorithms in this paper easier.
6functions of the jammer’s actions i.e., the signaling scheme, power level and pulse jamming ratio [11]
and thereby allow the jammer to learn about its actions.
B. MAB formulation
The actions (also called the arms) of the mixed MAB are defined by the triplet [Signaling scheme,
JNR, ρ]. The strategy set S, that constitutes JNR and ρ, is a compact subset of (R+)2. For each time
t ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}, a cost (or objective) function (feedback metric) Ct : {J ,S} → R is evaluated
by the jammer, where J indicates the set of signaling schemes. Since we are interested in finding
power efficient jamming strategies that maximize the error rate at the victim receiver, we define Ct =
max(SERt − SERtarget, 0)/JNRt or max(PERt − PERtarget, 0)/JNRt where JNRt indicates the
average JNR used by the jammer at time t and SERt, PERt are the average symbol/packet error
rate obtained by using a particular strategy {J ∈ J , s ∈ S} at time t and SERtarget, PERtarget are
the target error rates that should be achieved by the jammer (achieving a target PER is a common
constraint in practical wireless systems [29] and this target is defined a priori). The dependence of the
cost function on the actions taken is unknown to the jammer a priori because it is not aware of a) the
victim’s transmission strategy, b) the power of the signals x and j at the receiver (the probability of
error is a function of these parameters as discussed in [11]) and hence needs to be learned over time in
order to optimize the jamming strategy. The jammer does this by trying to maximize Ct as it intends to
maximize the error rate at the victim receiver using minimum energy.
When the action set is a continuum of arms, most existing MAB works [28] assume that the arms
that are close to each other (in terms of the Euclidean distance), yield similar expected costs. Such
assumptions on the cost function will at least help in learning strategies that are close to the optimal
strategy (in terms of the achievable cost function) if not the optimal strategy [28]. In this paper, for the
first time in a wireless communication setting, we prove that this condition indeed holds true i.e., it is not
an assumption but rather an intrinsic (proven) feature of our problem and we show how to evaluate the
Ho¨lder continuity parameters for these cost functions. Specifically, Theorem 1 shows that this similarity
condition indeed holds true when the cost function is SER and extends it to other commonly used cost
functions in wireless scenarios. The result in this Theorem is crucial for deriving the regret and high
confidence bounds of the proposed learning algorithm.
Formally, the expected or average cost function C¯(J , s) : {J ,S} → R is shown to be uniformly
locally Ho¨lder continuous with constant L ∈ [0,∞), exponent α ∈ (0, 1] and restriction δ > 0. More
specifically, the uniformly locally Ho¨lder continuity condition (described with respect to the continuous
7arm parameters) is given by,
|C¯(J , s)− C¯(J , s′)| ≤ L||s− s′||α, (1)
for all s, s′ ∈ S with 0 ≤ ||s − s′|| ≤ δ [32] (||s|| denotes the Euclidean norm of the continuous 2 × 1
action vector s). The best strategy s∗ satisfies arg mins∈S C¯(J , s) for a signaling scheme J . As we will
shown next, the algorithms proposed in this paper only require the jammer to know a bound on L and
α, since it is not always possible to be aware of the cost function (its dependence on the actions taken)
a priori.
Theorem 1. For any set of strategies used by the victim and the jammer, the resultant SER is uniformly
locally Ho¨lder continuous.
Proof : See Appendix A. In an online setting, the Ho¨lder continuity parameters L and α can be estimated
if the jammer has knowledge about the victim’s transmission strategy, else a bound on L and α works.
We now give an illustrative example for Theorem 1. Consider the scenario where both the jammer
and the victim use BPSK modulated signals. The average SER (first we show for the case when ρ = 1
which will be used to prove the result for ρ ∈ (0, 1]) is given by [11]
pe(SNR, JNR) =
1
4
(
erfc
(√
SNR +
√
JNR√
2
)
+ erfc
(√
SNR−√JNR√
2
))
, (2)
where erfc is the complementary error function. To show the Ho¨lder continuity of the above expression,
consider JNR1 and JNR2 such that |JNR1 − JNR2| ≤ δ, for some δ > 0 (i.e., to consider the case of
local Ho¨lder continuity). Then by using the Taylor series expansion of the erfc function and ignoring
the higher order terms i.e., erfc(x) ≈ 1− 2√
pi
x+ 2
3
√
pi
x3, we have
pe(SNR,JNR1)−pe(SNR,JNR2)≈
√
SNR
8pi
(JNR1−JNR2) ≤
√
SNRmax
8pi
(JNR1−JNR2) , (3)
where SNRmax relates to the maximum received power level of the victim signal (practical wireless
communication devices have limitations on the maximum power levels that can be used). This shows
that SER satisfies the Ho¨lder continuity property when ρ = 1.
For the case of a pulsed jamming signal i.e., ρ ∈ (0, 1], the SER is given by ρpe(SNR, JNR/ρ) +
(1 − ρ)pe(SNR, 0). The second term is obviously Ho¨lder continuous with respect to the strategy vec-
tor s = {JNR, ρ} for L1 = 1, α1 = 1. For the first term, consider the probability of error at the
strategies s1 = {JNR1, ρ1} and s2 = {JNR2, ρ2}. To prove the Ho¨lder continuity, we consider the
expression ρ1pe(SNR, JNR1/ρ1)−ρ2pe(SNR, JNR2/ρ2) =
{
ρ1pe
(
SNR, JNR1ρ1
)
−ρ1pe
(
SNR, JNR2ρ1
)}
+{
ρ1pe
(
SNR, JNR2ρ1
)
− ρ2pe
(
SNR, JNR2ρ2
)}
. Again, the first term in this expression is Ho¨lder continuous
with L2 =
√
SNRmax
8pi , α2 = 1 which follows from (3). Using the Taylor series for erfc and after some
8manipulations, the second term in this expression can be written as
ρ1pe(SNR,
JNR2
ρ1
)− ρ2pe(SNR, JNR2
ρ2
) ≤ (ρ1 − ρ2)erfc(SNR)
2
≤ erfc(SNR)
2
√
(JNR1 − JNR2)2 + (ρ1 − ρ2)2 , L3||s− s′||α3 . (4)
Overall, with L = 3 min(L1, L2, L3) and α = 1, the SER obtained under pulsed jamming is also Ho¨lder
continuous. In general, since the jammer does not know the victim signals’ parameters, it is not aware
of the exact structure of the SER expression and hence it can use the worst case L and α (across all
possible scenarios that may occur in a real time scenario) to account for the Ho¨lder continuity of Ct.
Corollary 1. PER and max(PER− PERtarget, 0)/JNR are Ho¨lder continuous.
Proof: PER can be expressed in terms of the SER. For example, PER = 1 − (1 − SER)Nsym
when a packet is said to be in error if at least one symbol in the packet is received incorrectly. Since
Theorem 1 shows that SER is Ho¨lder continuous, it follows that PER and as a consequence max(PER−
PERtarget, 0)/JNR are also Ho¨lder continuous (remember that JNR ∈ [JNRmin, JNRmax]). It is worth
noticing that the Ho¨lder continuity parameters L and α depend on the physical layer signaling parameters
such as a) the modulation schemes used by the victim and the jammer and b) SNR of the victim signal.
C. Proposed Algorithm
The proposed Jamming Bandits (JB) algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. At each time t, JB forms an
estimate Cˆt on the cost function C¯, which is an average of the costs observed over the first t − 1 time
slots. Since some dimensions of the joint action set are continuous, and have infinitely many elements,
it is not possible to learn the cost function for each of these values, because it will require a certain
amount of time to explore each action from these infinite sets, which thereby cannot be completed in
finite time. To overcome this, JB discretizes them and then approximately learns the cost function among
these discretized versions. For example, ρ is discretized as {1/M, 2/M, . . . , 1} and JNR is discretized
as JNRmin + (JNRmax − JNRmin) ∗ {1/M, 2/M, . . . , 1}, where M is the discretization parameter. The
performance of JB will depend on M , hence, we will also compute the optimal value of M in the
following sections.
JB divides the entire time horizon n into several rounds with different durations. Within every round
(the duration T of each round is also adaptive as shown in Alg. 1), JB uses a different discretization
parameter M to create the discretized joint action set, and learns the best jamming strategy over this set,
as shown in Fig. 2. The discretization M increases with the number of rounds. Its value given in line
2 of Algorithm 1 balances the loss incurred due to exploring actions in the discretized set and the loss
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Fig. 2. An illustration of learning in one round of JB. It is possible that the optimal strategy denoted by {J ∗, JNR∗, ρ∗} lies
out of the set of discretized strategies. In such a case the jammer learns the best discretized strategy, but based on the value
of the discretization parameter M , the loss incurred by using this strategy with respect to the optimal strategy can be bounded
using the Ho¨lder continuity condition. The value of the discretization M is shown in the figure and Alg. 1.
incurred due to the sub-optimality resulting from the discretization. The various losses incurred and the
derivation of the optimal value for M will be explained in detail in Theorem 2.
Algorithm 1 Jamming Bandits (JB)
T← 1
1: while T ≤ n do
2: M ← d(
√
T
logT L2
α/2)
1
1+α e
3: Initialize UCB1 algorithm [26] with strategy set {AWGN,BPSK,QPSK}×
{1/M, 2/M, . . . , 1}×JNRmin+(JNRmax-JNRmin)*{1/M, 2/M, . . . , 1}, where × indicates the
Cartesian product.
4: for t = T, T + 1, . . . ,min(2T − 1, n) do
5: Choose arm {Jt, st} from UCB1 [26]
6: Play {Jt, st} and then estimate Ct(Jt, st) using the ACK/NACK packets
7: For each arm in the strategy set, update its index using Ct(Jt, st).
8: end for
9: T ← 2T
10: end while
Another advantage of JB is that the jammer does not need to know the time horizon n. Time horizon
n is only given as an input to JB to indicate the stopping time. All our results in this paper hold true
for any time horizon n. This is achieved by increasing the time duration of the inner loop in JB to 2T
at the end of every round (popularly known as the doubling trick [28]). The inner loop can use any
of the standard finite-armed MAB algorithms such as UCB1 [26], which is shown in Algorithm 2 for
completeness.
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Algorithm 2 Upper confidence bound-based MAB algorithm - UCB1
Initialization: Play each arm once
Loop:
Use signaling scheme J , power JNR, pulse jamming ratio ρ, which maximizes Cˆ(J , JNR, ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
) +√
2logt
uJ ,s
where t is the time duration since the start of the algorithm, uJ ,s is the number of times the
arm {J , s} has been played and Cˆ(J , JNR, ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
) is the estimated average reward obtained from this
arm.
D. Upper bound on the regret
For the proposed algorithm, the n-step regret Rn is the expected difference in the total cost between the
strategies chosen by the proposed algorithm i.e., {J1, s1}, {J1, s2}, . . . , {Jn, sn} and the best strategy
{J ∗, s∗}. More specifically, we have Rn = E
[∑n
t=1
(
Ct(J ∗, s∗)−Ct(Jt, st)
)]
, where the expectation
is over all the possible strategies that can be chosen by the proposed algorithm. Here we present an upper
bound on the cumulative regret that is incurred by the jammer when it uses Algorithm 1 to minimize
regret or in other words maximize the cost/objective function.
Theorem 2. The regret of JB is O(Nmodn
α+2
2(α+1) (logn)
α
2(α+1) ).
Proof : See Appendix B.
Remark 1. The upper bound on regret increases as Nmod increases. This is because the jammer now
has to spend more time in identifying the optimal jamming signaling scheme. This does not mean that
the jammer is doing worse, since as Nmod increases, the jamming performance of the benchmark against
which the regret is calculated also gets better. Hence, the jammer will converge to a better strategy,
though it learns more slowly. Further, the regret decreases as α increases because higher values of α
indicate that it is easier to separate strategies that are close (in Euclidean distance) to each other.
Corollary 2. The average cumulative regret of JB converges to 0. Its convergence rate is given as
O(n −α2(α+1) (logn) α2(α+1) ).
The average cumulative regret converges to 0 as n increases. These results establish the learning
performance i.e., the rate of learning (how fast the regret converges to 0) of JB and indicate the speed at
which the jammer learns the optimal jamming strategy using Algorithm 1. Since the proposed algorithms
and hence their regret bounds are dependent only on L and α, which are in turn a function of the various
signal parameters such as the modulation schemes used by the victim and the jammer, the wireless channel
model i.e., AWGN channel, Rayleigh fading channel etc, the proposed algorithms can be extended to a
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wide variety of wireless scenarios by only changing these parameters. The exact values of L and α need
not be known in these cases (because the jammer may not have complete knowledge of the wireless
channel conditions), the worst case L and α (as shown in the BPSK example below Theorem 1) can be
used in the proposed JB algorithm.
E. High Confidence Bounds
The confidence bounds provide an a priori probabilistic guarantee on the desired level of jamming
performance (e.g., SER or PER) that can be achieved at a given time. We first present the one-step
confidence bounds i.e., the instantaneous regret and later show the confidence level obtained on the
cumulative regret over n time steps.
The sub-optimality gap ∆i of the ith arm {J i, si} (recall that NmodM2 arms can be chosen in one
round of JB), is defined as C¯(J ∗, s∗) − C¯(J i, si). We say that an arm is sub-optimal if it belongs to
the set U> (set of arms whose sub-optimality gap exceeds a threshold based on the required jamming
confidence level) which is defined in detail in Appendix C. Let ui(t) denote the total number of times
the ith arm has been chosen until time t and U(T ) indicate the set of time instants t ∈ [1, T ] for which
ui(t) ≤ 8 log(T )∆2i for some sub-optimal arm i ∈ U>.
Theorem 3. (i) Let δ = 2 × 2 3α+22(1+α)L 11+α
(
logT
T
) α
2(1+α) and M be defined as in Algorithm 1. Then for
any t ∈ [1, T ]\U(T ), with probability at least 1 − 2(Nmod + M2)t−4, the expected cost of the chosen
jamming strategy (Jt, st) is at most C¯(J ∗, s∗) + δ. In other words,
P
(
C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(Jt, st) > δ
) ≤ 2(Nmod +M2)t−4.
(ii) We also have
E[|U(T )|] ≤
T∑
t=1
P (a sub-optimal arm i ∈ U> is chosen at t)
≤ 8
∑
i∈U>
(
log T
∆2i
)
+
(
1 +
pi2
3
)
|U>|,
which means that our confidence bounds hold in all except logarithmically many time slots in expectation.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 2. A lower bound on the sub-optimality gap i.e., ∆min = mini∈U> ∆i, can be used to approx-
imately estimate U(T ). For instance, in a wireless setting when SER is used as the cost function, if
the jammer is aware of the smallest tolerable error in SER that is allowed, then it can approximately
evaluate U(T ). A detailed discussion on how the jammer can estimate U(T ) is given in Appendix C.
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Corollary 3. The one-step regret converges to zero in probability i.e.,
lim
T→∞
(
lim
t→T
P
(
C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(Jt, st) > δ
))
= 0.
Theorem 3 can be used to achieve desired confidence levels about the jamming performance, which is
particularly important in military settings. In order to achieve a desired confidence level (e.g., about the
SER inflicted at the victim receiver) δ at each time step, the probability of choosing a jamming action
that incurs regret more than δ must be very small. In order to achieve this objective, the jammer can
set M as max{(2
α+4
2 L
δ )
1/α, d(
√
T
logT L2
α/2)
1
1+α e}. By doing this, the jammer will not only guarantee a
small regret at every time step, but also chooses an arm that is within δ of the optimal arm at every
time step with high probability. Hence, the one time step confidence about the jamming performance
can be translated into overall jamming confidence. It was, however, observed that the proposed algorithm
performs significantly better than predicted by this bound (Section V).
Theorem 4. For any signaling scheme J chosen by the jammer, P
(∑T
t=1(C¯(J , s∗) − C¯(J , st)) >(
8
3
(
T
logT
) 4
1+α
)1/3)
< , ∀  > 0.
Proof: See Appendix C. Using Theorem 4, a confidence bound on the overall cumulative regret defined
as
∑T
t=1[C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(Jt, st)] can be directly obtained as shown in Appendix C. This bound indicates
the overall confidence acquired by the jammer. The regret performance of JB will be discussed in more
detail via numerical results in Section V.
Theorem 5. Let δ = 2 × 2 5α+42(1+α)L 11+α
(
logT
T
) α
2(1+α) and M be defined as in JB. Then, for any t ∈
[1, T ]\U(T ), the jammer knows that with probability at least 1 − 2(Nmod + M2)t−4 − t−16, the true
expected cost of the optimal strategy is at most Cˆ(Jt, st)+δ, where Cˆ(Jt, st) is the sample mean estimate
of C¯(Jt, st), the expected reward of strategy (Jt, st) selected by the jammer at time t.
Proof: See Appendix D. Theorem 5 presents a high confidence bound on the estimated cost function of
any strategy used by the jammer. Such high confidence bounds (Theorems 3-5) will enable the jammer to
make decisions on the jamming duration and jamming budget, which is explained below with an example.
Again, this is a worst case bound and the proposed algorithm performs much better than predicted by
the bound as will be discussed in detail in Section V.
Remark 3. Fig. 3 summarizes the importance and usability of Theorems 3 and 5 in realtime wireless
communication environments. The high confidence bounds for the regret help the jammer decide the
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number of symbols (or packets) to be jammed to disrupt the communication between the victim transmitter-
receiver pair. For example, such confidence is necessary in scenarios where the victim uses erasure or
rateless codes and/or HARQ-based transmission schemes. In the case of rateless codes, a message of
length N is encoded into an infinitely long new message sequence of length Nˆ >> N (for example, by
using random linear combinations) out of which any N are linearly independent. Upon successfully
receiving N such messages, the entire message can be recovered. Under such scenarios, the high
confidence bounds help the jammer to decide the number of packets/ time instants to jam successfully in
order to disrupt the wireless link between the transmitter-receiver pair.
For instance, when M = 15, we have at large time t, δ > 0.01, i.e., P (SER∗ − ˆSERt > 0.01) = 0,
where SER∗ is the optimal average SER achievable and ˆSERt is the estimated SER achieved by
the strategy used at time t. If the jammer estimates SER as 0.065 then the best estimate of the SER∗
indicates that it is less than or equal to 0.075. Using such knowledge, the jammer can identify the
minimum number of packets it has to jam so as to disrupt the communication and prevent the exchange
of a certain number of packets (which in applications such as video transmission can completely break
down the system). As an example, consider the case when packets of length 100 symbols are exchanged
and that a packet is said to be in error only when there are more than 10 errors in the packet. Thus,
in order to jam 100 packets successfully the jammer needs to affect at least 463 packets on an average
if SER∗ (which corresponds to PER = 0.2167) was achievable. However, since it can only achieve
ˆSER = 0.065 i.e., ˆPER = 0.1153, it has to jam at least 865 packets on an average to have sufficient
confidence regarding its jamming performance. The jammer can accordingly plan its energy budget/
jamming duration etc. by using such knowledge.
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F. Improving convergence via arm elimination
When the number of signaling schemes that the jammer can choose from is large or when α is small
(i.e., it is difficult to separate the arms that are close to each other), then the learning speed using JB
can be relatively slow. We now present an algorithm to improve the learning rate and convergence speed
of JB under such scenarios. In order to achieve this, Algorithm 1 is modified to use the UCB-Improved
algorithm [34] inside the inner loop of JB instead of UCB1. The UCB-Improved algorithm eliminates
sub-optimal arms (that are evaluated in terms of the mean rewards and the confidence intervals), in order
to avoid exploring the sub-optimal arms (which is important in electronic warfare scenarios). The modified
algorithm and the associated UCB-Improved algorithm are shown in Algorithms 3 and 4 respectively.
Algorithm 3 Jamming Bandits with Arm Elimination
T← 1
1: while T ≤ n do
2: Initialize UCB-Improved [34] algorithm with the strategy set {AWGN,BPSK,QPSK}×
{1/M, 2/M, . . . , 1}×JNRmin+(JNRmax-JNRmin)*{1/M, 2/M, . . . , 1}, where × indicates the
Cartesian product.
3: for t = T, T + 1, . . . ,min(2T − 1, n) do
4: Use the UCB-Improved [34] MAB Algorithm to eliminate sub-optimal arms
5: end for
6: T ← 2T
7: end while
Algorithm 4 UCB-Improved
Input the set of arms A and time horizon T
∆˜0 = 0, B0 = A
1: for rounds m = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 12 log2
T
e do
2: Arm Selection
3: If |Bm| > 1, choose each arm in Bm for nm = d2log(T ∆˜
2
m)
∆˜2m
e
4: Else choose the remaining arm until time T
5: Arm Elimination
6: Delete arm i in the set Bm for which
(
C¯i +
√
log(T ∆˜2m))
2nm
)
<maxj∈Bm
(
C¯j −
√
log(T ∆˜2m))
2nm
)
to obtain the set of new arms Bm+1; C¯i is the average cost incurred by playing arm i.
7: Reset ∆˜m : ∆˜m+1 = ∆˜m/2 .
8: end for
To obtain the value of M i.e., the discretization for JNR and ρ, we used numerical optimization tools to
solve TL
(
2
M2
)α
2 −
(√
M2T log(M
2log(M2))√
log(M2)
)
= 0. See Appendix E for more details. Later in Section V,
we show the benefits of using this algorithm via numerical simulations. The regret bounds can be derived
along similar lines to Theorems 1-5 by using the properties of the UCB-Improved algorithm [34].
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IV. LEARNING JAMMING STRATEGIES AGAINST A TIME-VARYING USER
In this section, we consider scenarios where the victim transmitter-receiver pair can choose their
strategies in a time-varying manner.3 We specifically consider two scenarios a) when the victim changes
its strategies in an i.i.d. fashion and b) when the victim is adapting its transmission strategies to overcome
the interference seen in the wireless channel.4 The worst case jammer’s performance can be understood
by considering a victim that changes its strategies in an i.i.d. fashion. For example, such i.i.d. strategies
are commonly employed in a multichannel wireless system where the victim can randomly hop onto
different channels (either in a pre-defined or an un-coordinated fashion [35]) to probabilistically avoid
jamming/ interference. The randomized strategies chosen by the victim can confuse the jammer regarding
its performance. For instance, if the jammer continues using the same strategy irrespective of the victim’s
strategy, then the jammers’ performance will be easily degraded. However, if the jammer is capable of
anticipating such random changes by the victim and learns the jamming strategies, then it can disrupt
the communication irrespective of the victims’ strategies.
We assume that the victim can modify its power levels and the modulation scheme to adapt to the
wireless environment (the most widely used adaption strategy [33]). Again we allow the jammer to learn
the optimal jamming strategy by optimizing the 3 actions, namely signaling scheme, JNR and ρ as before.
The jammer has to learn its actions without any knowledge regarding the victim’s strategy set and any
possible distribution that the victim may employ to choose from this strategy set. We use Algorithm 1
and not Algorithm 3 to address such dynamic scenarios because eliminating arms in such a time-varying
environment may not always be beneficial. For example, a certain arm might not be good against one
strategy used by the victim but might be the optimal strategy when the victim changes its strategy.
While the regret bounds presented below assume that the victim employs a random unknown dis-
tribution over its strategy set and chooses its actions in an i.i.d. manner (also referred to as stochastic
strategies) i.e., scenario (a) mentioned earlier, we discuss the jammer’s performance against any strategy
(i.e., without any predefined distribution over the strategies, for example, increase the power levels when
the PER increases) employed by the victim (which includes scenario (b)) in Section V.
3The model considered in this formulation is different from the adversarial scenarios studied in the context of MAB algorithms
[27]. In the adversarial bandit cases, the adversary (or the victim in this current context) observes the action of the jammer and
then assigns a reward function either based on the jammers’ current action or on the entire history of jammers’ actions. However,
in the current scenario we assume that the user picks a strategy in an i.i.d manner independent of the jammer. Considering
learning algorithms in adversarial scenarios is reserved for future work.
4While the victim is not entirely adaptive against the jammers’ strategies, it is adaptive in the sense that it can choose from a
set of strategies to overcome the jamming/ interference effects. For example, it can be adaptive based on the PER seen at the
victim receiver. This scenario is discussed in detail in Section V.
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1) Upper bound on the regret: Let {pi}|P|i=1 denote the probability distribution with which the victim
selects its strategies in an i.i.d manner, from a set consisting of |P| number of possible strategies.
The jammer is not aware of this distribution chosen by the victim and needs to learn the optimal
strategy by repeatedly interacting with the victim. The regret under such scenarios is defined as Rn =
E
[∑n
t=1
(
Ct(J ∗, s∗)−Ct(Jt, st)
)]
, where the expectation is over the random strategies chosen by the
jammer as well as the victim (which is different from the formulation in Section III). Thus, the above
expression can be re-written as Rn = E
[∑n
t=1
∑|P|
i=1 pi
(
Cit(J ∗, s∗)− Cit(Jt, st)
)]
, with Cit indicating
the cost function when the victim uses strategy i with probability pi and the expectation is now taken
only over the strategies chosen by the jammer.
Theorem 6. The regret of JB when the victim employs stochastic strategies isO(Nmodn
α+2
2(α+1) (logn)
α
2(α+1) ).
Proof: See Appendix F. This is an upper bound on the cumulative regret incurred by JB under such
stochastic scenarios. Similar to the regret incurred by JB in Theorem 1, the regret under stochastic cases
also converges to 0 as O(n −α2(α+1) (logn) α2(α+1) ). The one step confidence bounds similar to Theorems 3-5
can be derived even in this case but are skipped due to lack of space.
Remark 4. When the victim is adapting its strategies based on the error rates observed over a given time
duration (as is typically done in practical wireless communication systems), we show that by employing
sliding-window based algorithms, the jammer can effectively track the changes in the victim and jam it
in a power efficient manner. This is discussed more in detail in the next section.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We first discuss the learning behavior of the jammer against a transmitter-receiver pair that employs
a static strategy and later consider the performance against adaptive strategies. To validate the learning
performance, we compare the results against the optimal jamming signals that are obtained when the
jammer has complete knowledge about the victim [11]. It is assumed that the victim and the jammer
send 1 packet with 10000 symbols at any time t. A packet is said to be in error if at least 10% of
the symbols are received in error at the victim receiver so as to capture the effect of error correction
coding schemes. The minimum and the maximum SNR, JNR levels are taken to be 0 dB and 20 dB
respectively. The set of signaling schemes for the transmitter-receiver pair is {BPSK,QPSK} and for
the jammer is {AWGN,BPSK,QPSK}5 [11] i.e., Nmod = 3.
5It is very easy to extend the results in this paper and [11] to PAM and QAM signals of any constellation size.
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Fig. 4. Instantaneous SER achieved by the JB algorithm
when JNR = 10dB, SNR = 20dB and the victim uses
BPSK.
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Fig. 5. Average SER achieved by the jammer when JNR =
10dB, SNR = 20dB and the victim uses BPSK. The jammer
learns to use BPSK with ρ = 0.078 using JB. The learning
performance of the -greedy learning algorithm with various
discretization factors M is also shown.
A. Fixed user strategy
The jammer uses SER or PER inflicted at the victim receiver (estimated using the ACK and NACK
packets) as feedback to learn the optimal jamming strategy. We first consider a scenario where the JNR
is fixed and the jammer can optimize its jamming strategy by choosing the optimal signaling scheme
J ∗ and the associated pulse jamming ratio ρ∗. These results enable comparison with previously known
results obtained via an optimization framework with full knowledge about the victim as discussed in [11].
Note that unlike [11], the jammer here does not know the signaling parameters of the victim signal, and
hence it cannot solve an optimization problem to find the optimal jamming strategy. In contrast, it learns
over time the optimal strategy by simply learning the expected reward of each strategy it tries.
Figs. 4-7 show the results obtained in this setting (fixed SNR, modulation scheme for the victim and
fixed JNR). For a fair comparison with [11], we initially assume that the jammer can directly estimate
the SER inflicted at the victim receiver. We will shortly discuss the more practical setting in which the
jammer can only estimate PER. In all these figures, it is seen that the jammers’ performance converges to
that of the optimal jamming strategies [11]. For example, in Figs. 4 and 5, when the victim transmitter-
receiver pair exchange a BPSK modulated signal at SNR = 20 dB, the jammer learns to use BPSK
signaling at JNR = 10 dB and ρ = 0.078 which is in agreement with the results presented in [11].
Fig. 4 shows the instantaneous learning performance of the jammer in terms of the SER achieved by
using the JB algorithm. The variation in the achieved SER after convergence is only due to the wireless
channel. The time instants at which the SER varies a lot, i.e., the dips in SER seen in these results
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Fig. 7. Average SER achieved by the jammer when JNR =
10dB, SNR = 20dB and the victim uses BPSK and there is
a phase offset between the two signals. The jammer learns to
use BPSK with ρ = 0.051 using JB. The learning performance
of the -greedy learning algorithm with various discretization
factors M is also shown.
are due to the exploration phases performed when a new value of discretization i.e., M is chosen by
the algorithm (recall from Algorithm 1 that for every round the discretization M is re-evaluated). Fig. 5
shows the average SER attained by this learning algorithm. Also shown in Fig. 5 is the performance of
the the -greedy learning algorithm [26] with exponentially decreasing exploration probability (t) = 
t
10
(initial exploration probability is taken to be 0.9) and various discretization factors M . In the -greedy
learning algorithm, the jammer explores (i.e., it tries new strategies) with probability (t) and exploits
(i.e., uses the best known strategy that has been tried thus far) with probability 1 − (t). It is seen that
unless the optimal discretization factor M is known (so that the optimal strategy is one among the possible
strategies that can be chosen by the -Greedy algorithm), the -greedy algorithm performs significantly
worse in comparison to the novel bandit-based learning algorithm.
Similar results were observed in the case of QPSK signaling as seen in Fig. 6. Notice that while the
-greedy algorithm with discretization M = 20 did not achieve satisfactory results in the BPSK signaling
scenario, it achieved close to optimal results in the QPSK signaling scenario as seen in Fig. 6. Thus, the
performance of the -greedy algorithm highly depends on M , and it can be sub-optimal if M is chosen
incorrectly. However, in our learning setting it is not possible to know the optimal M a priori. Also,
the performance of AWGN jamming (which is the most widely used jamming signal [14], [33] when
the jammer is not intelligent) is significantly lower than the performance of JB. The algorithms behave
along similar lines in a non-coherent scenario where there is a random unknown phase offset between
the jamming and the victim signals, as seen in Fig. 7. The jammer learned to use BPSK signaling at
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Fig. 9. Average reward obtained by the jammer against a
BPSK modulated victim, SNR = 20 dB. The optimal reward
is obtained via grid search with discretization M = 100.
ρ = 0.051 while the optimal jamming signal derived in [11] indicates that ρ∗ = 0.06 when JNR = 10 dB
and SNR = 20 dB.
Now that we have established the performance of the proposed learning algorithm by comparing with
previously known results, we now consider the performance of the learning algorithm in terms of the
PER which is a more relevant and practical metric to be considered in wireless environments. Further,
it is also easy for the jammer to estimate PER by observing the ACKs/NACKs exchanged between
victim receiver and transmitter via the feedback channel [31]. Fig. 8 shows the learning performance of
various algorithms in terms of the average PER inflicted by the jammer at the victim receiver. While
the jammer learns to use BPSK as the optimal signaling scheme, the optimal ρ value learned in this case
is 0.23 which is different from the value of ρ learned in Fig. 5. This is because PER is used as the
cost function in learning the jamming strategies. It is clear that both the AWGN jamming and -greedy
learning algorithm (that uses a sub-optimal value of M ) achieve a PER = 0 based on the SER results in
Fig. 5. Even in this case, JB outperforms traditional jamming techniques that use AWGN or the -greedy
learning algorithm.
The cost function is taken as max(0, (PER(t)−0.8)/JNR(t)) (the cost function remains to be Ho¨lder
continuous and is bounded in [0, 1]) to ensure that we choose only those strategies which achieve at least
80% PER (remember, the jammer intends to maximize this cost/objective function). Fig. 9 compares the
learning performance of JB with respect to the optimal strategy and Fig. 10 shows the confidence levels
as predicted by the one-step regret bound in Theorem 3 and that achieved by JB. The optimal reward is
estimated by performing an extensive grid search (M = 100) over the entire strategy set. The steps in
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Fig. 11. Learning the jamming strategies by using arm-
elimination. The victim uses BPSK with SNR = 20dB. The
jammer learned to use BPSK with JNR = 15 dB and ρ = 0.22.
logδ seen in Fig. 10 are due to change in the discretization M as shown in Algorithm 1. As mentioned
before, the algorithm performs much better than predicted by the high confidence bound (evidenced by
a lower value of δ).
Fig. 11 shows the learning results obtained by using Algorithm 3 i.e., JB uses the UCB-Improved
algorithm in the inner loop instead of the UCB1 algorithm. It shows the learning performance of
Algorithms 1 and 3 in one inner loop iteration when T = 105 (i.e., for one value of discretization
M evaluated as shown in Algorithm 1). It is seen that the Algorithm 3 converges faster in comparison
to the earlier approach as the algorithm eliminates sub-optimal arms and thereby only exploits the best
jamming strategy. Even in this case the jammer learned to use BPSK signaling scheme against a BPSK-
modulated victim signal. Further notice that the algorithm converges in about 10000 time steps in this
case as opposed to > 50000 time steps using JB. Recall that in the simulations we assume that one
packet is sent every time instant and hence in order to obtain reliable estimates of the performance of
each jamming strategy, the jammer requires about 10000 time instants.
B. Jamming Performance Against an Adaptive Victim
We first assume that the victim employs a uniform distribution over its strategy set i.e., it chooses
uniformly at random (at every time instant) a power level in the range [SNRmin,SNRmax] and the
modulation scheme from the set {BPSK,QPSK}. The performance of JB when the victim employs such
a stochastic strategy is shown in Fig. 12. Again, the superior performance of the bandit-based learning
algorithm when compared to the traditionally used AWGN jamming and naive learning algorithms such
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Fig. 13. Learning against a victim with time-varying strategies.
The figure shows the power levels adaptation by the jammer and
that used by the victim.
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Fig. 14. Learning against a victim with time-varying strategies.
The figure shows the power levels adaptation by the jammer
using a drifting algorithm and that used by the victim.
as -Greedy is proved from these results.6
When the victim changes its strategy rapidly, JB cannot track the changes perfectly as seen in Fig. 13
because it learns over all past information, and prior information may not convey knowledge about the
current strategy used by the victim which can be completely different from the prior strategy. In such
cases, it is important to learn only from recent past history, which can be achieved by using JB on a
recent window of past history (for instance, a sliding window-based algorithm to track changes in the
environment) [36]. Specifically, we use the concept of drifting [36] to adapt to the victim’s strategy. In
this algorithm, each round i (which is of T time steps, where T = 2i) is divided it into several frames
each of W time instants. Within each frame, the first W/2 time steps, are termed as the passive slot
and the second W/2 time instants are termed as the active slot. In the first frame, both the slots will
6It is worth noticing that model-free learning algorithms such as Q-Learning and SARSA [20] cannot be employed in the
scenarios considered in this paper because it is assumed that the jammer cannot observe any of the environment parameters such
as the victim’s modulation scheme and power levels. However, it is expected that the performance of the learning algorithms
can be improved when such additional information is available, which is typically the case in optimization-based algorithms.
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be taken to be active slots. Each passive slot overlaps with the active slot of the previous frame. If time
t belongs to active slot of frame w, then actions are taken as per the UCB1 indices evaluated in this
particular frame w. However, if it belongs to the passive slot of frame w, which is taken to overlap with
the active slot of frame w − 1, then it takes actions as per the indices of the frame w − 1, but updates
the UCB1 indices so that it can be used in frame w. Specifically, at the start of every frame w, the
counters and mean reward estimates are all reset to zero and when actions are taken in the passive slot
of frame w, these counters and reward estimated are updated so as to be used in the active slot. Thus
when the algorithm enters the active slot of frame w, it already has some observations using which it
can exploit without wasting time in the exploration phase. Such splitting of the time horizon will enable
the jammer to quickly adapt to the victim’s varying strategies. Please see [36] for more details on the
drifting algorithm. Specifically, we consider the drifting algorithm with a window length W = 25000.
Fig. 14 shows the jammers’ power level adaption when the victim is randomly varying its power levels
across time and the jammer employs the drifting algorithm in conjunction with JB. The dips seen at
regular intervals in Fig. 14 are due to the proposed sliding window-based algorithm where the user resets
the algorithm at regular intervals to adapt to the changing wireless environment. The PER achieved by
this algorithm is similar to the results shown in Figs. 8, 10 in comparison to other jamming techniques.
While Fig. 14 considered the case when the victim changes its power levels randomly, the jammer can also
easily track the victim when it employs commonly used adaption strategies such as increasing the power
levels when PER increases and vice versa. These results successfully illustrate the adaptive capabilities
of the proposed learning algorithms that can overcome the difficulties faced by JB as shown in Fig. 13.
C. Multiple Victims
In this subsection, we consider a case when the jammer uses an omnidirectional antenna and intends
to jam two victims in a network. Interesting scenarios arise in this scenario because the jammer has
to optimize its jamming strategy based on the PER of both the victims. For example, when both the
victims use BPSK, the jammer will learn to use BPSK signaling scheme but the power level at which it
should jam depends on the relative power levels of both the victims. Several factors such as path loss,
shadowing etc. akin to practical wireless systems can be introduced into this problem, but we are mainly
interested in understanding the learning performance of the jammer. Hence we ignore these physical layer
parameters and assume that both the victims are affected by the jamming signal with the same JNR. The
jammer considers the mean packet error rate seen at both these victims as feedback with target mean
PER = 0.8, in order to learn the performance of its actions.
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Fig. 15. PER achieved by the jammer against 2 users, user 1
uses BPSK at 15dB and user 2 sends BPSK at 5dB. The jammer
learns to use BPSK signal with power 13dB and ρ = 0.46.
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Fig. 16. PER achieved by the jammer against 2 users, user 1
sends QPSK at 5dB and user 2 sends BPSK at 15dB. The jammer
learns to use BPSK signal with power 11.25dB and ρ = 0.25.
Fig. 15 shows the learning performance of the jammer against 2 users that employ BPSK signaling at
different power levels. It is seen that the jammer learns to use BPSK signaling as well (since BPSK is
optimal to be used against BPSK signaling as discussed in [11]). Similar learning results were achieved
when both the users employ QPSK signaling. Figs. 16 shows the learning performance when one user
uses QPSK and and the other user uses BPSK. It was observed that when the victim with BPSK has
higher power than QPSK victim, the jammer learns to use the BPSK jamming signal and vice versa. This
again agrees with previous results which show that BPSK (QPSK) is better to jam a BPSK (QPSK) signal.
Also, the learning algorithm performs comparably well to the optimal strategy obtained by performing
an extensive grid search over the complete set of strategies. Fig. 17 shows the performance of the JB
algorithm against the two users that are randomly changing their power levels to overcome interference
(this captures a much more difficult scenario as compared to standard adaptive mechanisms, such as
power control schemes, in which the victim increases its power level until it reaches a maximum so as
to overcome interference). Although each victim has a different adaption cycle (specifically, victim 1
changes its power levels based on the performance history over the past 50000 time instants and victim
2 adapts its power levels over a window of size 30000 time instants), the jammer is capable of tracking
these changes in a satisfactory manner.
By using a weighted PER metric rather than a mean PER metric, the jammer can prioritize jamming
one set of transmit-receive pairs against the others. Several other MU cases can easily be considered by
using this framework. For example, by allowing the jammer to choose the direction of jamming as another
action, the jammer can prioritize jamming only the transmit-receive pairs in a given direction rather
than spread all its power uniformly across all directions. However, such improved jamming techniques
24
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
x 105
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Time
Po
w
er
 le
ve
ls
 
 
Instantaneous jammer power level
User 1 P
x
User 2 P
x
Converged jammer power level
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The jammer learns to use the BPSK signaling scheme to achieve power efficient jamming strategies and also tracks the changes
in the users’ strategies.
will only come at the expense of more knowledge about the location of the users, users’ behavior etc.
Nevertheless, it is worth appreciating the applicability of the proposed algorithms to a wide variety of
electronic warfare-type scenarios.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proved that a cognitive jammer can learn the optimal physical layer jamming strategy
in an electronic warfare-type scenario without having any a priori knowledge about the system dynamics.
Novel learning algorithms based on the multi-armed bandit framework were developed to optimally jam
victim transmitter-receiver pairs. The learning algorithms are capable of learning the optimal jamming
strategies in both coherent and non-coherent scenarios where the jamming signal and the victim signal
are either phase synchronous or asynchronous with each other. Also, the rate of learning is faster
in comparison to commonly used reinforcement learning algorithms. These algorithms are capable of
tracking the different strategies used by multiple adaptive transmitter-receiver pairs. Moreover, they come
with strong theoretical guarantees on the performance including confidence bounds which are used to
estimate the probability of successful jamming at any time instant.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For the system model in Section II, the average probability of error at the victim receiver that uses a
maximum likelihood (ML) detector (since it is assumed that the victim transmit-receive pair is not aware
of the presence of the jammer) is given by
pe (j,SNR, JNR) = 1−
∫
x
∫
Ω
fN
(
y −
√
SNRx−
√
JNRj
)
fX(x)dydx, (5)
where Ω indicates the ML decision region for x. For instance, when the signal levels are ±A, Ω =
real (y) < 0 when x = −A and Ω = real (y) > 0 when x = +A. In the above equation, the received
signal normalized by the noise power σ2 is considered. Further, fX indicates the distribution of the
signal x (described by the modulation scheme used by the victim) and fN indicates the additive white
Gaussian noise distribution. For a pulsed jamming signal with pulsing ratio ρ, the SER is given by
ρpe(j,SNR,
JNR
ρ ) + (1 − ρ)pe(j,SNR, 0). We first establish the Ho¨lder continuity of pe (j,SNR, JNR)
which can then be used to prove the Ho¨lder continuity of pe for pulsed jamming scenarios.
In order to prove that SER i.e., pe is uniformly locally Lipschitz, we show that |pe(j,SNR, JNR1)−
pe(j,SNR, JNR2)| ≤ L|JNR1 − JNR2|α for some L > 0 and α > 0. Using (5) we have,
|pe(j,SNR, JNR1)− pe(j,SNR, JNR2)|
= |
∫
x
∫
Ω
[
fN
(
y −
√
SNRx−
√
JNR2j
)
− fN
(
y −
√
SNRx−
√
JNR1j
)]
fX(x)dydx|
≤
∫
x
∫
Ω
[
|fN
(
y −
√
SNRx−
√
JNR2j
)
− fN
(
y −
√
SNRx−
√
JNR1j
)
|
]
fX(x)dydx. (6)
Thus it is sufficient to show that |fN
(
y −√SNRx−√JNR2j
)
− fN
(
y −√SNRx−√JNR1j
)
| ≤
L′|JNR1 − JNR2|α′ for some L′ > 0 and α′ > 0 which follows from the definition of fN as it is
the probability density function (pdf) of the noise signal n. We briefly show it below for completeness.
Since we already normalized the signal by σ2, the pdf of n is now given by the zero mean unit variance
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Gaussian distribution.
|fN
(
y −
√
SNRx−
√
JNR2j
)
− fN
(
y −
√
SNRs−
√
JNR1j
)
|
= | 1√
2pi
[
exp(−(y −
√
SNRx−
√
JNR2j)
2)− exp(−(y −
√
SNRx−
√
JNR1j)
2)
]
|
≈ 1√
2pi
[
|(
√
JNR1 −
√
JNR2)j|
]
, (7)
where the last approximation is obtained by ignoring the higher order terms since we only consider the
cases where |JNR1 − JNR2| ≤ δ i.e., local Ho¨lder continuity. Then, for a given jamming signal j, (7)
can be bounded as
1√
2pi
[
|(
√
JNR1 −
√
JNR2)j|
]
≤
√
JNR2
2pi
|
(√
1 +
δ
JNR2
− 1
)
| ≈
√
JNR2
2pi
|
(
1 +
δ
2JNR2
− 1
)
|
≤
√
1
2piJNRmin
δ =
√
1
2piJNRmin
(JNR1 − JNR2), (8)
which proves that argument inside the integral in (6) is uniformly locally Lipschitz with L′ =
√
1
2piJNRmin
and α′ = 1. In the above proof we used the fact that |j| ≤ 1 for standard signaling schemes that are
employed by the jammer (for the AWGN jamming signal, the SER is obtained by using a Gaussian
distribution with variance 1 + JNR i.e., a slightly different approach when compared to (5) is taken and
by following the above sequence of arguments, Ho¨lder continuity can be proved even in this case). Using
(8), the overall SER i.e., pe(j,SNR, JNR) is also uniformly locally Ho¨lder continuous. By following
the same steps, the Ho¨lder continuity for the pulsed jamming cases can also be proved. An example for
the Ho¨lder continuity in the pulsed jamming case is shown in Section III.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Since the set of signaling schemes is discrete, we first obtain the regret bound for a particular signaling
scheme J . It is easy to see that the overall regret bound is a scaled version (by Nmod) of the regret
achievable for a single signaling scheme. Since the time horizon of the inner loop of Algorithm 1 is
T , we first show that the regret incurred by the inner loop is O(√M2T log(T )). Since the overall time
horizon is generally unknown, the algorithm is run for several rounds of time steps on the order of 2i
as shown in Algorithm 1 and the regret bounds for the overall algorithm can be achieved by using the
doubling trick [32].
The upper bound on the overall regret incurred by Algorithm 1 can be obtained by upper bounding∑T
t=1
(
C¯(J , s∗)− C¯(J , st)
)
, where C¯ indicates the average cost function and s∗ is the best strategy for
a given signaling scheme J and st is the actual strategy chosen at time t. For ease of presentation, J
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is ignored in the rest of the proof. We obtain the regret bound in two steps by rewriting it as
T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s∗)− C¯(st)
)
=
T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s∗)− C¯(s′))+ T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s′)− C¯(st)
)
, (9)
where s′ ∈ {1/M, 2/M, . . . , 1}×JNRmin+(JNRmax−JNRmin)∗{1/M, 2/M, . . . , 1} is the strategy near-
est (in terms of the Euclidean distance) to s∗. Then we have ||s′− s∗||=
√
(JNR′ − JNR∗)2 + (ρ′ − ρ∗)2
≤
√
2
M2 based on the discretization of the continuous arms set in Algorithm 1.
For the first term in the above equation, by using the Ho¨lder continuity properties of the average cost
function C¯, we have
E
( T∑
t=1
Ct(s
∗)− Ct(s′)
)
=
T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s∗)− C¯(s′)) ≤ TL( 2
M2
)α/2
. (10)
We now bound the second term E
(∑T
t=1Ct(s
′) − Ct(st)
)
=
∑T
t=1
(
C¯(s′)− C¯(st)
)
. Due to the dis-
cretization technique used in Algorithm 1, this problem is equivalent to a standard MAB problem with
M2 arms [26]. In order to bound (10), we define two sets of arms: near-optimal arms and sub-optimal
arms. We set ∆ =
√
M2log(T )/T and say that an arm is sub-optimal in this case, if its regret incurred
is greater than ∆ and near-optimal when its regret is less than ∆. Thus, for a near-optimal arm, even
when that arm is selected at all time steps, the contribution to regret will be at most T∆. In contrast for
a sub-optimal arm, the contribution to the regret when it is selected can be large. Since we use the UCB1
algorithm, it can be shown that the sub-optimal arms will be chosen only O(log(T )/∆(s)2) times (∆(s)
is the regret of the strategy s) [26], before they are identified as sub-optimal. Thus the regret for these
sub-optimal arms is on the order of O(log(T )/∆) since ∆(s) > ∆. From these arguments the second
term in (9) can be upper bounded as
E
( T∑
t=1
Ct(st)− Ct(s′)
)
≤ O(
√
M2T log(T )). (11)
Using (10) and (11), and setting M = d(
√
T
log(T )L2
α/2)
1
1+α e (this is obtained by matching the regret
bounds shown in (10) and (11)), the regret for any given signaling scheme is given by O(√M2T log(T )).
By noting the fact that the jammer can choose from Nmod possible signaling schemes and using the value
of M , the doubling trick, and summing the regret over all inner loop iterations of Algorithm 1, the regret
over the entire time horizon n can be expressed as O(Nmodn
α+2
2(α+1) (logn)
α
2(α+1) ).
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HIGH CONFIDENCE BOUNDS
Here, we present high confidence bounds on the one-step and cumulative regret.
A. Proof of Theorem 3
We bound the one-step regret as follows,
P (C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(Jt, st) > δ) = P (C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(Jt, s∗) + C¯(Jt, s∗)− C¯(Jt, st) > δ)
= P (C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(Jt, s∗) + C¯(Jt, s∗)− C¯(Jt, s′) + C¯(Jt, s′)− C¯(Jt, st) > δ)
≤ P (C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(Jt, s∗) ≥ δ
4
) + P (C¯(Jt, s∗)− C¯(Jt, s′) ≥ δ
2
)
+ P (C¯(Jt, s′)− C¯(Jt, st) ≥ δ
4
) (12)
For the second term in (12), we have
P (C¯(Jt, s∗)− C¯(Jt, s′) ≥ δ
2
) = 1− P (C¯(Jt, s∗)− C¯(Jt, s′) ≤ δ
2
), (13)
which for δ > 2L( 2M2 )
α
2 converges in probability to 0 because
1− P (C¯(Jt, s∗)− C¯(Jt, s′) ≤ δ
2
) ≤ 1− P (C¯(Jt, s∗)− C¯(Jt, s′) ≤ L|st − s′|α ≤ δ
2
). (14)
The last equality is a result of the Ho¨lder continuity properties of the cost function.
Recall that we use the UCB1 algorithm to choose arms within one round of JB. Hence to bound the
term P (C¯(J ∗, s∗) − C¯(Jt, s∗) ≥ δ4) in (12), we define two sets of arms (i) set of arms J> with sub-
optimality gap ∆Ji = C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(J i, s∗) > δ/4 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ Nmod, also referred to as sub-optimal
arms and (ii) rest of the arms denoted by J<. Then we have
P (C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(Jt, s∗) ≥ δ
4
) = P (∪i∈J>Armt = J i) ≤
∑
i∈J>
P (Armt = J i), (15)
where Armt = J i indicates that J i is chosen at time t and the inequality follows from the union
bound. Let J(T ) be the (random) set of time steps for which ji(T ) ≤ 8 log T/(∆Ji )2 for some sub-
optimal signaling scheme i in {1, 2, . . . , T}. The time steps in J(T ) are the time steps in which there
is a high probability that a sub-optimal signaling scheme is selected. In contrast, for time steps in
J(T )c := {1, 2, . . . , T}\J(T ), all the arms are selected sufficiently many times to have accurate estimates
so that the best arm can be correctly identified with a very high probability. Following the analysis of
Theorem 1 in [26] for the UCB1 algorithm, it can be shown that at time steps t ∈ J(T )c, the probability
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of choosing a sub-optimal signaling scheme i is bounded above by 2t−4. Hence, for t ∈ J(T )c, (16) can
be written as
P (C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(Jt, s∗) ≥ δ
4
) ≤
∑
i∈J>
2t−4 < 2Nmodt−4, (16)
Along similar lines, for the third term in (12), we have
P (C¯(Jt, s′)− C¯(Jt, st) ≥ δ
4
) < 2M2t−4, (17)
for all t ∈ [1, T ]\S(T ) where S> and S(T ) are defined along similar lines as J> and J(T ) but for the
M2 discrete arms that correspond to the discretized space of JNR and ρ.
Overall, by choosing δ > 2L( 2M2 )
α
2 (specifically, we choose δ = 4L( 2M2 )
α
2 ), the one step regret can
be shown to converge in probability to 0 as P
(
C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(Jt, st) > δ
) ≤ 2(Nmod + M2)t−4 ∀t ∈
[1, T ]\{J (T )∪S(T )}. Since the one-step regret converges in probability to 0, it implies that the jammer
can reach the optimal value of the cost function by using Algorithm 1. The value of δ is governed by the
discretization M and the regret incurred by the jammer is mainly due to discretization of the continuum
arm space which for larger values of M (possible as T increases as shown in Algorithm 1) tightens the
confidence bound on the regret.
While the above analysis presented a confidence bound on the one-step regret, it did so by splitting
the choice of the signaling scheme and the continuous parameters. We unify these analyses below. The
overall sub-optimality gap of the ith arm 1 ≤ i ≤ NmodM2, denoted by {J i, si} (recall that NmodM2
arms can be chosen in one round of JB), is defined as C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(J i, si). Let ui(t) denote the total
number of times the ith arm has been chosen until time t and U(T ) indicate the set of time instants
t ∈ [1, T ] for which ui(t) ≤ 8 log(T )∆2i for some sub-optimal arm i ∈ U> with a sub-optimality gap ∆i.
It is easy to see that these definitions directly result in the following relationships: U> ⊆ J> ∪ S> and
U(T ) ⊆ J(T ) ∪ S(T ).
Note that if the jammer knows a lower bound ∆ > 0 on the minimum sub-optimality gap (for instance,
in a wireless communication setting when SER is taken as the cost function, the lower bound can indicate
the smallest error in the SER that JB can be allowed to make i.e., we want the choices of JB to be
closest to the optimal SER∗ that can be achievable) i.e., ∆min := mini∈U> ∆i, then it can estimate if
t belongs to U(T ) or not by checking if ui(t) > 8 log T/∆2 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , Nmod. Let Uˆ(T )c be
the set of this estimated time slots, for which we have Uˆ(T )c ⊆ U(T )c. The jammer will know that
for at least t ∈ Uˆ(T )c the proposed confidence bound will hold true. While the exact set of all time
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instants that belong to U(T ) may be unknown to the jammer, we can bound the size of the set E[U(T )]
as follows [26]:
E[|U(T )|] ≤
T∑
t=1
P (a sub-optimal arm i ∈ U> is chosen at t)
≤ 8
∑
i∈U>
(
log T
∆2i
)
+
(
1 +
pi2
3
)
|U>|,
which follows from Theorem 1 in [26]. This suggests that our confidence bounds hold in all except
logarithmically many time slots in expectation. We stress here that the size of the set U(T ) presented
above is the worst case bound and the algorithm performs much better than predicted by the bounds as
shown in Fig. 10 in Section V. This completes the proof of the Theorem.
B. Proof of Theorem 4
Here, we present a high confidence bound on the cumulative regret incurred by the jammer when it
uses Algorithm 1. Similar to the regret bound in Theorem 2, we have for any given signaling scheme
used by the jammer,
P
(
T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s∗)− C¯(st)
)
> δ
)
= P
(
T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s∗)− C¯(s′) + C¯(s′)− C¯(st)
)
> δ
)
≤ P
(
T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s∗)− C¯(s′)) > δ/2)+ P ( T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s′)− C¯(st)
)
> δ/2
)
, (18)
where s′ was defined earlier. For the first term, choosing δ > 2TL
(
2
M2
)α/2
= O(T
1+2α
2(1+α) (logT )
1
2(1+α) )
and using the Ho¨lder continuity properties of the cost function gives the following,
P
(
T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s∗)− C¯(s′)) > δ/2) = 1− [P ( T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s∗)− C¯(s′)) < δ/2)]
≤ 1−
[
P
(
T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s∗)− C¯(s′)) < LT |s∗ − s′|α < δ/2)]=0, ∀ > 0, (19)
where the last equality is a result of the choice of δ.
For the second term in (18), as earlier, we use tricks from the UCB1 algorithm to obtain confidence
bounds as it is a standard finite-armed (M2 arms) bandit problem [32]. Since the regret in the case of a
finite-armed bandit problem can be represented in terms of the number of times an arm has been chosen,
we first present a lemma that provides confidence bounds on the same i.e., we evaluate P (sk(T ) > u)
where sk(T ) denotes the total number of times arm k(1 ≤ k ≤ M2) has been chosen until time T .
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Consider the event E defined by
E = {{∀t : u+ 1 ≤ t ≤ T s.t. Bk,u,t ≤ τ} ∧ {∀v : 1 ≤ v ≤ T − u s.t. Bk∗,v,u+v > τ}} , (20)
where Bk,u,t indicates the UCB1 index [26] of arm k at time instant t when it has been pulled u times
until the time time instant t, Bk∗,v,u+v indicates the UCB1 index of the optimal arm defined along similar
lines and τ ∈ R is any real number. In the definition of event E , we have two sub-events, where the
first one suggests that the UCB1 index of the kth arm is less than τ and the second event indicates that
since arm k was chosen u times, the optimal arm will be chosen v ∈ [1, T − u] times when its index
exceeds τ . Then, for any 1 ≤ v ≤ T − u and u+ v ≤ t ≤ T we have Bk∗,v,t ≥ Bk∗,v,u+v > τ ≥ Bk,u,t
(because we want to compare the indices of the arms at time t given the fact that arm k was chosen u
times before this and the optimal arm was chosen v times before this time instant t), which suggests that
arm k would not be chosen the (u+ 1)th time at any time t ≤ T (notice that the exact time instants at
which the arms were chosen do not matter, only the number of times an arm chosen decides the UCB1
index of that arm). Thus we have by contradiction
P (sk(T ) > u) ≤ P (∃t : u+ 1 ≤ t ≤ T s.t. Bk,u,t > τ)
+ P (∃v : 1 ≤ v ≤ T − u s.t. Bk∗,v,u+v ≤ τ) . (21)
We will now bound the second term in (18) i.e., P
(∑T
t=1
(
C¯(s′)− C¯(st)
)
> δ/2
)
. As mentioned
earlier, since this is a standard MAB problem, we have the following
P
(
T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s′)− C¯(st)
)
> δ/2
)
= P
 ∑
k:∆Sk>0
∆Sk sk(T ) > δ/2
 ≤ ∑
k:∆Sk>0
P
(
sk(T ) >
δ
2∆Sk
)
≤
∑
k:∆Sk>0
P
(
sk(T ) >
δ
2M2∆Sk
)
, (22)
where ∆Sk = C¯(s
′)−C¯(sk) i.e., the regret incurred for playing arm k ∈ [1,M2]. For any δ ≥ 16M2 log(T )
∆Smin
where ∆Smin is the minimum regret incurred across all arms, we have
δ
2M2∆Sk
≥ 8
(∆Sk )
2 log(T ). Let uk =
d δ
2M2∆Sk
e. Using the bound on sk(T ) in (21) and with u = uk, τ = s¯′, we have
P (sk(T ) > uk) ≤
T∑
t=uk+1
P (Bk,uk,t > C¯(s
′)) +
T−uk∑
v=1
P (Bk∗,v,uk+v ≤ C¯(s′)). (23)
Using the condition on δ, we have
√
2log(T )
uk
≤ ∆Sk /2 which upon rearranging the terms also gives
T ≤ euk(∆
S
k
)2
8 . Then we can bound P (Bk,uk,t > C¯(s
′)) (which indicates the fact that the upper confidence
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bound on the sub-optimal arm is higher than the mean reward/cost function incurred by the optimal
strategy s′) as
P (Bk,uk,t > C¯(s
′)) ≤ P (Bk,uk,T > C¯(s′)) = P
Cˆ(sk) +√2log(T )
uk
> C¯(sk) + ∆Sk

≤ P (C¯(sk)− C¯(s′) > ∆Sk /2) ≤ e−uk(∆Sk )2/2, (24)
where Cˆ(sk) indicates the estimate of the cost function/reward obtained by suing strategy sk, the second
inequality is obtained by using the definition of uk and δ, and the third inequality by using the Chernoff-
Hoeffding bound. Using (24) and the fact that T ≤ euk(∆
S
k
)2
8 , the first summation in (23) can be upper
bounded by e−
uk(∆
S
k
)2
4 .
The second summation in (23) is bounded by using the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound as∑T−uk
v=1 P (Bk∗,v,uk+v ≤ C¯(s′)) ≤
∑T−uk
v=1 (uk + v)
−4 ≤ ∑Ty=uk y−4 ≤ ∫∞y=uk y−4 = u−3k3 (by change of
variable). Overall, (23) can be upper bounded as
P (sk(T ) > uk) ≤ e−
uk(∆
S
k )
2
4 +
u−3k
3
. (25)
For uk = d δ2M2∆Sk e, the above bound is given by
P
(
sk(T ) >
δ
2M2∆Sk
)
= P
(
sk(T ) > d δ
2M2∆Sk
e
)
≤ e−
δ∆Sk
8M2 + 8δ−3
(M2∆Sk )
3
3
. (26)
Thus we have the upper bound on the second term in (18) as
P
(
T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s′)− C¯(st)
)
> δ/2
)
≤
∑
k:∆k>0
{
e−
δ∆k
8M2 + 8δ−3
(M2∆Sk )
3
3
}
≤ (M2 − 1)
(
1 +
8
3
δ−3M6
)
≈ 8
3
δ−3M8 , , (27)
where we used the fact that ∆k ∈ [0, 1]. Overall using (19) and (27), for all
δ > max
(
2TL
(
2
M2
)α/2
, 16M2 log(T )
∆Smin
)
, we have
P
( T∑
t=1
(
C¯(s∗)− C¯(st)
)
>
(
8
3
( T
log(T )
) 4
1+α )1/3)
< . (28)
Since ∆min is unknown a priori, a jammer can use any known lower bound ∆ to obtain δ. This lower
bound can be obtained as described in the proof of Theorem 3.
Similar bounds i.e., of the same order can be obtained irrespective of the signaling scheme used by the
jammer (here the jammer uses Nmod signaling schemes) as it is just another finite armed bandit problem.
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This can be done as follows
P
( T∑
t=1
(C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(Jt, st) > δ)
)
= P
( T∑
t=1
(C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(J ∗, st) + C¯(J ∗, st)− C¯(Jt, st) > δ)
)
≤ P
( T∑
t=1
(C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(J ∗, st) > δ/2)
)
+ P
( T∑
t=1
(C¯(J ∗, st)− C¯(Jt, st) > δ/2)
)
, (29)
where the first term in the above equation can be directly bounded by using the analysis presented for
(28) and the second term can be bounded directly using the properties of the UCB1 algorithm since it is
a discrete arm selection (specifically, by using the steps in (20)-(28)).
APPENDIX D
HIGH CONFIDENCE BOUND ON ESTIMATES
Proof of Theorem 5: A high confidence bound on the mean estimate of the reward/cost function for
any strategy that is used at time t by the jammer is developed. To do so, we evaluate P (C¯(J ∗, s∗) −
Cˆ(Jt, st) > δ) as follows,
P (C¯(J ∗, s∗)− Cˆ(Jt, st) > δ) ≤ P (C¯(J ∗, s∗)− C¯(Jt, st) > δ
2
) + P (C¯(Jt, st)− Cˆ(Jt, st) > δ
2
), (30)
where C¯(Jt, st) is the actual mean reward/cost of the strategy (Jt, st). The first term can be bounded us-
ing Theorem 3 where it can be shown to be less than 2(Nmod+M2)t−4 for all δ > 2
5α+4
2(1+α)L
1
1+α
(
logT
T
) α
2(1+α)
and t ∈ [1, T ]\{U(T )}, where U(T ) is defined in the proof of Theorem 3. For the second term, notice
that we are comparing the actual and estimated mean rewards of the strategy (Jt, st) which can be
bounded using the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound and the properties of the UCB1 algorithm as follows,
P (C¯(Jt, st)− Cˆ(Jt, st) > δ
2
) ≤ exp(−u(t)δ
2
2
), (31)
where u(t) is the total number of times the strategy (Jt, st) has been used until time t. Since we
use the UCB1 algorithm, in all the time instants t in which the arm (Jt, st) has been chosen at least
8logt
∆2t
where (∆t = C¯(J ∗, s∗) − C¯(Jt, st) is the sub-optimality gap of the strategy (Jt, st)), we have
P (C¯(Jt, st) − Cˆ(Jt, st) > δ2) ≤ exp(−16logt) = t−16, because ∆t ≤ δ/2 from the bound on the first
term. This completes the proof of the Theorem.
APPENDIX E
JAMMING BANDITS WITH ARM ELIMINATION
Algorithm 3 is the modified JB algorithm that uses the UCB-Improved algorithm [34] instead of
the UCB1 algorithm. Even in this algorithm, the regret has two terms, similar to the earlier regret
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bounds presented in (10) and (11). While the bound in (10) continues to hold true even in this case,
the bound in (11) changes due to the UCB-Improved algorithm. From [34], the regret bound for a M2-
armed bandit algorithm is given by O(
√
M2T log(M
2log(M2))√
log(M2)
). Thereby the overall regret is TL
(
2
M2
)α
2 +
O
(√
M2T log(M
2log(M2))√
log(M2)
)
. By using the doubling trick, the regret bounds for the overall time horizon
n can be obtained.
APPENDIX F
JAMMING BANDITS AGAINST TIME-VARYING VICTIMS
For a given signaling scheme J used by the jammer, the average regret (i.e., with respect to the
victim’s strategies) can be bounded as below,
Rn =
[ n∑
t=1
|P|∑
i=1
pi
(
E(Cit(s
∗))−E(Cit(st))
)]
=
[ n∑
t=1
|P|∑
i=1
pi
(
C¯it(s
∗)− C¯it(st)
)]
=
[ n∑
t=1
|P|∑
i=1
pi
(
{C¯it(s∗)− C¯it(s′)}+ {C¯it(s′)− C¯it(st)}
)]
, (32)
where C¯ indicates the average cost function, s∗ is the optimal jamming strategy across all stochastic
strategies that can be used by the victim (since the jammer is not aware of the action taken by the user),
s′ is the strategy closest in Euclidean distance to the optimal strategy (as defined in the Section III) and
st is the actual strategy chosen at time t. The first term can be bounded using the Ho¨lder continuity
properties of the cost function (see Appendix B where a similar analysis is done for the fixed user
strategy case). The second term is bounded as follows. Since the jammer is not aware of the users’
strategy, partition of the action space is done a priori and hence we use the same discretization M
across all users’ strategies. Thus define ∆ =
√
M2log(T )/T . For each action i taken by the user, define
∆ij = C¯(s
′) − C¯(sj) as the loss in rewards when a sub-optimal arm j is chosen. We split the arms
into two sets, a) for those arms which satisfy ∆ij < ∆, the near optimal arms and b) ∆ij > ∆, the
sub-optimal arms. For the first set, the maximum regret incurred against each user strategy is T∆ (over
a time period T of the inner loop in Algorithm 1). For the second set, since we use the UCB1 algorithm,
each sub-optimal arm is only chosen a maximum of 8log(T )∆2ij + 1 +
Π2
3 times [26]. Thus we can bound the
regret for the arms in the second set as ∆ij
(
8log(T )
∆2ij
+ 1 + Π
2
3
)
. Overall the regret is upper bounded by∑|P|
i=1 pi
(
TL
(
2
M2
)α/2
+T∆ +
∑M2
j=1 ∆ij
[
8log(T )
∆2ij
+ 1 + Π
2
3
] )
, which by using the relationship between
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∆ and ∆ij and the fact that ∆ij ∈ [0, 1] can further be upper bounded as(
TL
(
2
M2
)α/2
+ T∆ +M2
[8log(T )
∆
+ 1 +
Π2
3
])
≈ O(T α+22(α+1) log α2(α+1)T ). (33)
Since the jammer can choose from Nmod signaling schemes, the overall regret is the scaled (by Nmod)
version of (33), which is similar to the regret bound in Theorem 2. Remember this is just a upper bound
on the regret and that the actual regret depends on the strategy employed by the victim transmit-receive
pair. Also notice that, all the regret and high confidence bounds derived in Section III can also be extended
to this scenario as well.
